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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below properly conclude that plaintiffs' negligence claims 
were barred by the economic loss rule in granting defendants1 motion for judgment on 
the pleadings? The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for 
correctness viewing the pleadings in favor of the party resisting the motion. Miller v. 
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80. 
2. Did the Court below properly determine that plaintiffs1 complaint failed to 
state a claim for breach of contract? This issue is reviewed by the same standard set 
forth above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs alleged that in deciding to purchase a home from its former owners, 
they relied upon an appraisal prepared by defendants, which appraisal was performed in 
a negligent fashion, which resulted in plaintiffs overpaying for their home. They also 
alleged that the appraisal was "transferred" to them and, therefore, they had a claim for 
breach of contract against the defendants arising from faulty appraisal done for the 
home' s prior owners. 
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The Court below granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
finding that the plaintiffs' negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule and 
their contract claim failed because the parties whose contract rights were "transferred" 
to plaintiffs suffered no damage by virtue of the alleged breach of contract. 
According to plaintiffs' complaint, defendants performed an appraisal of a home 
located at 2071 East Worchester Drive for Dave Szumigala and Ellen Daley in 
December of 1996. Thereafter, that couple listed the home for sale. In January of 
1997, the Wests viewed the home, were told that it had been appraised for $240,000.00 
and decided to offer to purchase the home for $220,000.00, which offer was accepted. 
They further alleged that the appraisal was performed negligently and 
erroneously and that the actual market value of the home they purchased was only 
$190,000.00. They also alleged that the appraisal was "transferred" to them by the 
couple for whom it as performed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Utah, a claim for negligence is only actionable if such negligence causes a 
plaintiff physical injury or property damage, in the absence of a special duty of care 
obtaining between the plaintiff and the defendant. While plaintiffs claim that real estate 
appraisers owe the world a common law duty to perform their services consistently 
with the rules authorized by Utah's Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
2 
Practice, Utah Code Ann. §61-2b-27 (Rep.Vol. 6C 2000), it is clear that such rules do 
not create a duty to the public generally which can be enforced in an action for 
negligence. Having had no relationship with the plaintiffs when the appraisal in 
question was performed, defendants have no liability to plaintiffs for the loss they claim 
to have suffered by virtue of defendants' neglect. 
As the assignee of contract rights can only acquire the rights held by the 
assignor, the plaintiffs have no actionable claim for breach of contract because their 
assignors were alleged to have profited from the claimed breach and, therefore, have no 
claim for damages which could be assigned to plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFFS1 NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made a negligent 
misrepresentation in an appraisal upon which plaintiffs relied in paying too much for a 
home they purchased. These allegations fail to state an actionable claim for relief. 
In Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, this Court expressly held that under 
Utah law there is no actionable claim for negligent misrepresentation in the absence of 
property damage or bodily injury. This Court noted that such a claim is barred by the 
economic loss rule. 
The economic loss rule prevents a party from claiming 
3 
economic damages "in negligence absent physical property 
damage or bodily injury." 
2003 UT App 291 at 113 (quoting SME Indus., Inc., v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback& Assoc, Inc., 2001 UT 54, 132). 
In Fennell, the plaintiff claimed that property developers had negligently failed 
to disclose the existence of landslide danger on property ultimately purchased by the 
plaintiff, which damage greatly reduced the value of his property. This Court held that 
such a reduction in the value of property is exactly the type of economic loss which the 
rule prevents a plaintiff from seeking in a negligence action. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine as well. In American 
Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc., v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996), the 
Court held that allowing a plaintiff to seek purely economic damages for negligence 
would be to impose the [plaintiffs1] economic expectations 
upon parties whom the [plaintiffs] did not know and with 
whom they did not deal and upon contracts to which they 
were not a party. 
930P.2dat l l92 . 
The plaintiffs assert, however, that the Supreme Court has recognized an 
exception to the economic loss rule when the defendant owes an independent duty to the 
plaintiff. See Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 117. Plaintiffs assert that real estate 
appraisers owe the public an independent duty of care by virtue of the Uniform 
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Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. However, Utah law is clear that rules of 
conduct governing licensed professionals do not give rise to duties which can be 
enforced in tort actions. For example, in Tanasee v. Snow, 929 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah 
App. 1996), affirmed in part, reversed in part, 980 P.2d 208 (Utah 1999), this Court 
held that the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, governing lawyers, don't provide a 
private party with a cause of action nor create "any presumption that [a lawyer] 
breached a legally cognizable duty . . . " 
An argument similar to that advanced by the plaintiffs was rejected by the Court 
in The Provident Bank v. O'Brien, 53 Ca. Cir. 107, 2000 WL 1210873 (VA. Cir. 
2000) (copy in addendum). In O'Brien, a bank was claiming to have been damaged by 
reliance on an appraisal performed by defendants at the request of a different bank. 
The Court held that the plaintiff had no claim for breach of contract (as it was not a 
party to the appraisal contract) and no tort claim because of the economic loss rule. In 
so holding, the Court rejected the argument that the State's regulations pertaining to 
appraisers created an independent duty running from the appraiser to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff also relies on regulations and standards of the Real 
Estate Appraiser Board and VA. Code §54.1-2009, et. seq., 
as a source of duty owed to Plaintiff independent [of a 
contractual duty] . . . . Plaintiff contends that the regulations 
created an independent duty of care. However, in the 
absence of an independent common law duty arising 
between the parties that supports any economic loss claims 
based on tort theory, such regulations do not create duties 
5 
that, if breached, are actionable at common law or under 
any Virginia statute. Rather, they provide a guideline for 
regulating the profession. Furthermore, these regulations do 
not apply in the absence of a contract and thus are not 
analogous to independent common law duties that may form 
the basis for tort recovery between contracting parties. 
2000 WL 1210873 at p. 3 (citations omitted). 
The notion that professionals are subject to more expansive duties of care to the 
public because they are professionals was expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court in SME Indus., supra. In that case, the Court held that the economic loss rule 
barred plaintiffs' claim for architectural malpractice against parties with whom they had 
no contract and held that plaintiffs could protect themselves from the risks associated 
with such negligence by virtue of plaintiffs' own contractual provisions. 2001 UT 54, 
136. 
Even the authorities relied upon by the Wests acknowledge that the class of 
people to whom an appraiser owes a duty is limited to those people to whom the 
appraiser intends or knows the appraisal will be communicated. As stated by the 
Washington Supreme Court in Schaafv. Highfield, 896 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1995), a case 
cited by the plaintiffs, "[t]he liability of a real estate appraiser . . . extends only to 
those involved in the transaction that triggered the appraisal r e p o r t . . . " 896 P.2d at 
670. The plaintiffs were complete strangers to the "transaction" by which defendants 
prepared the report for Mr. Szumigala and Ms. Daley, whom they allege ordered the 
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appraisal to determine the market value of their home. When the appraisal was done in 
this case there was no lender involved and no prospective purchaser involved. 
Accordingly, the defendants' duty extended only to the parties with whom they 
contracted to perform the appraisal and not to the Wests. In the absence of any duty to 
the Wests, defendants have no liability for the economic loss the Wests claim to have 
suffered in reliance on the allegedly negligent appraisal. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
Plaintiffs1 complaint alleged, in conclusory terms, that they had a contract with 
defendants. However, the factual allegations fail to demonstrate any such contract. 
Plaintiffs pleaded that defendants entered into a contract with Mr. Szumigala and 
Ms. Daley to perform an appraisal on the home. Plaintiffs then alleged that Szumigala 
and Daley "transferred" the appraisal to plaintiffs. They then asserted that such a 
"transfer" gave them a contractual remedy for any damage plaintiffs claim to have 
suffered from the alleged breach of contract between defendants and Szumigala and 
Daley. 
Even assuming the so-called "transfer" constituted an assignment of all the 
transferors' rights under its contract with the defendants, such an assignment would 
give plaintiffs no right to recover not possessed by the assignors. It is axiomatic that 
" [a]n assignment of an interest in a contract gives the assignee the same rights of the 
7 
assignor and nothing more." Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 
(Utah 1988). The assignors in this case obviously had no claim against defendants for 
breach of contract because plaintiffs1 complaint alleges that the defendants1 breach 
resulted in a $30,000.00 windfall to the assignors. Absent any damage to the assignors 
there is no claim for breach of contract. 
The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are 
(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking 
recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party and 
(4) damages. 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397 at i[21 (emphasis added). 
As the parties who "transferred" their rights to plaintiffs had no claim for breach of 
contract, plaintiffs have no such claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs complaint did not state an actionable claim for negligence or breach of 
contract and the Court below properly granted defendants' judgment on the pleadings. 
That judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED th i s^ / / ( day of September, 2005. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley J 
Attorneys for Defendants^pffellants 
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Not Reported in S.E.2d, 53 Va. Or. 107, 2000 WL 1210873 (Va. Or. Ct.) 
Circuit Court of Virginia. 
THE PROVIDENT BANK, etc. 
v. 
Robert J. O'BRIEN, Jr., et. al. 
No. 181360. 
May 22, 2000. 
Douglas R. Kay, Esquire, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, McLean. 
Thomas P. Mains, Jr., Esquire, Mains & Mains, LC, McLean. 
Thomas L. Appier, Esquire, Crews & Hancock, PLC, Fairfax. 
WILLIAMS. 
* 1 Dear Counsel: 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff The Provident Bank's ("Provident") 
supplemental memorandum in opposition to Defendant Robert J. O'Brien, Jr.'s 
("Defendant") Demurrer to Count VI I I (Actual Fraud) and Motion for Reconsideration 
on Count I I (Negligence), Count I I I (Professional Malpractice), Count IV (Constructive 
Fraud), and Count V (Negligent Misrepresentation) of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment in 
the above-referenced case. On March 3, 2000, the Court sustained Defendant's 
Demurrer as to Counts I I through V and overruled the Demurrer as to Counts VI and 
VI I . The Court further allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to respond to Defendant's 
Demurrer as to Count VI I I . For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court 
overrules the Demurrer as to Counts IV and VI I I and denies the Motion for 
Reconsideration as to Counts I I , I I I , and V. 
I. Background 
Plaintiff is an Ohio corporation in the business of securing real estate loans and is 
authorized to do business in Virginia. Defendants Viny Bui and Robert O'Brien, Jr., are 
certified real estate appraisers. Defendant First Mortgage is a mortgage broker that 
transacts business in Virginia. On or about May 20 and May 22, 1997, Defendants Bui 
and O'Brien appraised property located in McLean, Virginia, on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Defendant First Mortgage ordered the appraisals on behalf of Plaintiff in connection 
with a request by Duk-Ki Min to refinance his existing loan on the property. 
Defendants Bui and O'Brien appraised the property as being worth $1 million. Plaintiff 
alleges that it relied on Defendants Bui and O'Brien's appraisals and extended a loan in 
the amount of $750,000 to Duk-Ki Min to refinance his existing loan on the property. 
The loan was secured by Mr. Min's personal residence. Duk-Ki Min defaulted on the 
loan, and subsequently, Plaintiff foreclosed on the property. The property was sold at a 
foreclosure sale on September 22, 1998, for $501,000. The deficiency balance due 
Plaintiff on the subject loan is $358,725.04. Plaintiff asserts that it conducted a 
reappraisal by another certified real estate appraiser after making its loan to Duk-Ki 
Min. That appraisal indicated that the value of the McLean property at issue was only 
$525,000, not $1 million as Defendants Bui and O'Brien had certified. On June 24, 
1999, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Judgment against Defendants. 
I I . Analysis 
Count IV (Constructive Fraud) & Count VI I I (Actual Fraud) 
Defendant O'Brien contends that an action for actual and constructive fraud cannot be 
maintained when the duty breached arises solely by reason of a contract between the 
parties. Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 507 S.E.2d 
http://web2.westlawxom/result/docimienttext.aspx?rs=WLW5.09&service=Find& 9/26/2005 
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344 (1998). In Richmond Metro., the plaintiff contracted with the defendant contractor 
to construct a baseball stadium according to certain design criteria. The defendant built 
the stadium and certified that the work was completed in accordance with the contract. 
The plaintiff later discovered that numerous conduits contained no grout or an 
insufficient amount of grout, causing the steel bars in the conduits to corrode. The 
plaintiff determined that the defendant attempted to conceal the fact that it had not 
filled the conduits with a sufficient amount of grout. In its motion for judgment, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract and committed actual and 
constructive fraud. The Court stated that the fraud arose during the performance of the 
contract at issue. The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed the causes of action for 
actual and constructive fraud because the duty breached arose solely by reason of a 
contract between the parties. 
* 2 Defendant O'Brien argues that, like Richmond Metro., the fraud here arises from 
contractual duties in the appraisal contract between appraisers Bui and O'Brien and 
First Mortgage. However, there is no allegation that Plaintiff was a party to that 
appraisal agreement. The Richmond Metro. Court noted that the case before it was not 
one of fraud in the inducement, but rather was predicated on a breach of duty arising 
from a contract. See id. at 560, 507 S.E.2d at 348. In the instant case, Plaintiff has 
alleged fraud in the inducement. Plaintiff in its Motion for Judgment alleges that 
appraisers Bui and O'Brien made misrepresentations of material fact upon which 
Plaintiff relied to its detriment. These allegations were made in both the constructive 
fraud and actual fraud counts. Therefore, the holding in Richmond Metro, does not 
preclude an allegation of fraud in the inducement. Accordingly, Defendant's Demurrer 
is overruled as to Counts IV and V I I I . 
Counts I I (Negligence), I I I (Professional Malpractice), and V (Negligent 
Misrepresentation) 
Appraisers Bui and O'Brien contend that negligence and related tort theories of 
recovery will not support a cause of action for economic damages where the 
relationship between the parties is contractual. [FN1] In Ward v. Ernst & Young, 246 
Va. 317, 435 S.E .2d 628 (1993), a corporation hired the defendant accounting firm to 
conduct an audit of its financial situation. Later, it was discovered that there were 
discrepancies in that audit. The plaintiff, sole shareholder of the corporation, relied 
upon those findings when he entered into a contract with another party. The plaintiff 
filed a motion for judgment against the defendant, alleging breach of contract and 
professional negligence. 
FN1. The Supreme Court of Virginia has noted that the "essence of 
constructive fraud is negligent misrepresentation." Richmond Metro. Auth. v. 
McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 559, 507 S.E.2d 344 f 347 (1998) 
(citing Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g Serv.f 251 Va. 289, 295, 467 S.E.2d 
778, 782 (1996). However, while Count IV as to Constructive Fraud is 
likened to negligent misrepresentation, the theory behind the Count is based 
on fraud in the inducement. As such, it is distinguishable from the 
constructive fraud alleged in Richmond Metro, where the court said that the 
allegations there were simply "negligent performance of contractual duties." 
Id. at 559, 507 S.E.2d at 347. 
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The Court in Ward reiterated the general rule that privity of contract is essential in 
maintaining an action for damages in situations where there is negligent performance 
of a contractual commitment. The Court refused to carve out an exception to that rule 
in situations involving a non-party to a contract. No merit was found in the argument 
made by the plaintiff that accountants are different from attorneys and architects in 
that they are certified and invite the public to rely on their work. That argument failed 
to persuade the Court in Ward to adopt an exception to the privity requirement. The 
Court held that "[w]hile attorneys and architects are not certified, they are licensed to 
invite the public to rely on their professional competence, and they are regulated and 
disciplined in the performance of services to those who accept their invitation." Id. at 
326, 435S.E .2da t632 . 
Negligence is actionable only for the violation of a duty to protect the safety of the 
person or property of another. Id. at 324, 435 S.E.2d at 631 (citing Blake Constr. Co. 
v. Alley, 233 Va. 3 1 , 35, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1987)). Thus, economic losses are not 
recoverable in tort as they are purely the result of disappointed economic expectations 
and no cause of action exists in such cases absent privity of contract. Id. at 326, 435 
S.E.2d at 632 (citing Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361 , 366, 384 S.E.2d 593, 595 
(1989)). I t is clear that tort claims are not available to Plaintiff because such economic 
losses are only recoverable in contract. Here, there is no privity of contract, which 
would allow Plaintiff to maintain its causes of action based on a negligence theory. 
* 3 Plaintiff also relies on regulations and standards of the Real Estate Appraiser Board 
and Va.Code § 54.1-2009, et. seq., as a source of duty owed to Plaintiff independent of 
appraisers Bui and O'Brien's contractual obligations. Plaintiff cites Richmond Metro, for 
the proposition that if "the relation of the plaintiff and the defendant be such that a 
duty arises from that relationship, irrespective of the contract, to take due care, and 
the defendants are negligent, then the action is one of tort." Plaintiff contends that the 
regulation created an independent duty of care. However, in the absence of an 
independent common law duty arising between the parties that supports any economic 
loss claims based on a tort theory, such regulations do not create legal duties that, if 
breached, are actionable at common law or under any Virginia statute. Rather, they 
provide a guideline for regulating the profession. Boyd v. Com., 236 Va. 346, 374 
S.E.2d 301 (1988) (citing Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 180 S.E. 416 (1935)) 
(supporting that common law is not to be considered as altered or changed by a 
statute unless the legislative intent is plainly manifest); see Allen v. Lindstrom, 237 Va. 
489, 379 S.E.2d 450 (1989) (stating that rules of conduct promulgated in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility furnishes no basis for private cause of action). Furthermore, 
these regulations do not apply in the absence of a contract and thus are not analogous 
to independent common law duties that may form the basis for tort recovery between 
contracting parties. 
Along the same rationale, the Court in Ward found that there was no professional 
negligence within the meaning of the statute at issue in that case in the absence of 
privity. Any regulation defining professional responsibility, as seen in Ward, precludes a 
private cause of action in instances where privity did not exist. As such, Plaintiff cannot 
rely upon regulations and standards of the Real Estate Appraiser Board or Va.Code § 
54.1-2009 to establish a tort action. 
I I I . Conclusion 
In the instant case, the fraud alleged was based on misrepresentations by appraisers 
Bui and O'Brien made to Plaintiff, which reached beyond the duty to perform based on 
the contract entered into by First Mortgage and Bui and O'Brien. Thus, Plaintiff can 
maintain its action for constructive fraud and actual fraud. 
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Absent privity of contract, economic losses are not recoverable based on tort theory. 
The Ward case is controlling. Thus, the sole remedy is based on contract law. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot rely on regulations or a Virginia statute to establish an 
independent common law duty for tort recovery. 
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court overrules Defendants' Demurrer as to 
Counts IV and VI I I and denies Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration on Counts I I , I I I 
and V. 
Va.Cir.Ct.,2000. 
Provident Bank v. O'Brien 
Not Reported in S.E.2d, 53 Va. Cir. 107, 2000 WL 1210873 (Va. Or. C t ) 
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